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Envisioned study
Three aims guide our study
Epistemological scope and «practical» definitions
Two main experimental setups
Series of experiments to investigate the neural basis for
violation of a rationality norm; our envisioned experimental
design is twofold:
A two-step procedure resting on the «bat and ball problem»
proposed by Shane Frederick (henceforth BB): the standard
condition (duplication of Shane Frederick’s experiment) plus a
second condition with cues to trigger the analytical response
A two-step procedure using an adapted version of Kahneman
and Tversky «asian-disease problem» (henceforth FE)
Use of event-related fMRI methodology to pin down the
neural mechanisms associated with specific behavioral
patterns («wrong» responses)
Comparison of the fMRI results: wrong response in BB and
violation of invariance rule in FE −→ Are similar neural
mechanisms involved?
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Envisioned study
Three aims guide our study
Epistemological scope and «practical» definitions
Focus on a possible feeling of «irrationality»
Zero in on these patterns: in FE the subject retrieves her
previous (inconsistent) response; in BB the intuitive response
is provided after some hesitation → hypothesis of a «specific
feeling of irrationality» – that we label «epistemic
emotion» – and search for possible neural correlates
This «epistemic emotion» – if exists – should be
task-related; must be distinguished with the purely
content-related «moral emotion» triggered by some special
features of the depicted situation −→ We envision to
minimize the latter hence use besides the original version of
asian-disease (involving direct human death) some more
neutral scenarios
S.Bourgeois-Gironde and Élise Payzan Princeton University 04/05
Project and background
Protocols and predictions (tentative)
General discussion
Envisioned study
Three aims guide our study
Epistemological scope and «practical» definitions
Pin down the nature of error in BB
Assume that we have replicated the aggregate result of
Shane Frederick in our own two-step «within-subjects» design
BB, namely we observe a massive rate of wrong responses
How to interpret this? The «dual process theory» is likely to
be an insightful benchmark Flesh out
Natural candidate to explain the BB-type error: the «override
failure» mechanism: insufficient activation of RPFC to correct
the impulsive intuitive response −→ We label it the cognitive
illusion hypothesis
«Competing» potential rationale for BB-type error: focus on a
«computational defect» (low analytical capabilities) −→ We
call it the cognitive limitation hypothesis
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Validity of the «dual process theory»
Assume that we observe in our two-step FE experiment a
massive rate of «framing effect»
How to interpret this? As in BB the «override failure»
(insufficient activation of RPFC to correct the impulsive
intuitive response) might entail the observed error −→ we
define this as the bounded rationality hypothesis
Alternative hypothesis: «framing effect» in FE is not due to a
cognitive defect, but to a subjective non equivalence between
the two options −→ we call this the «broadened
rationality» hypothesis
Corresponding behavioral model: incorporate moral and
psychological consequences in the set of choices of the subject
Envisioned experimental devices (three) to try to answer this
tricky question in this peculiar case
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Definitions
Henceforth – for more convenience – we will sum up the
rationality debate in this (provisional) fashion:
Regarding BB: bounded rationality hypothesis Vs limited
rationality hypothesis (cognitive limitations)
Regarding FE: bounded rationality hypothesis Vs
«broadened rationality» hypothesis
«Bounded rationality» ⇔ «cognitive illusion»: we will not
tend to classify as rationally bounded performances that are
either inherently cognitively limited or emotionally driven
More detail
«Broadened rationality» as «broadened» consequentialism
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The two-step «bat and ball problem»: whither a cognitive illusion?
An adapted version of the «asian-disease problem»
Behavioral data in the BB problem: experimental design
We contrast two conditions:
Condition 1: subjects give directly an answer to the BB task
Condition 2: subjects choose between three results which one
is correct: 1.10 1 1.05
Each subject performs the two tasks in this order
Condition 2 is expected to elicit a task-construal by S2
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Behavioral data in the BB problem: prediction
Test of the «cognitive illusion»: according to the bounded
rationality hypothesis, subjects don’t show any cognitive
limitation when they answer intuitively the BB problem: they
naturally substract 1 to the sum 1.10
Direct implication: if true, then subjects should be sensitive
to the alternative presentation of the problem
Hence we claim that subjects will perform better in
experiment 2 if they are not victim of a «cognitive
limitation» effect but of a «cognitive illusion» one
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The two-step «bat and ball problem»: whither a cognitive illusion?
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Neural data in the BB problem: factorial design and
predictions (1 out of 3)
The overall task (Cond 1 and Cond 2) is performed under
fMRI and investigated through an event-related protocol
We expect 3 types of answers in Condition 2 and observe
their neural substrates:
intuitive response is immediately given
Conflict between S1 ans S2:
intuitive response is given, with a delay −→ detection
without correction: S2 does not override
«right» analytical response is given: 1.05 −→ detection and
correction of the error: S2 overrides
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Neural data in the BB problem: factorial design and
predictions (2 out of 3)
We predict steady activation of S1’s specific substrates across
the two tasks
S1 activation is function of the nature of the stimuli and
following Dehaesne and Spelke, we predict a significant
activation of regions located in the parietal lobe, since
mathematical approximations tasks are performed in BB.
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Neural data in the BB problem: factorial design and
predictions (3 out of 3)
Regarding S2 activation, we look at the contrasts entailed by
the two conditions:
Detection without correction in Cond 2 – Immediate response
in Cond 1 = ∆1 −→ we predict RPFC specific activation
and ACC significant activation (conflict) if «dual process
theory» verified
Detection and correction in Cond 2 – Immediate response in
Cond 1 = ∆2 −→ RPFC and ACC specific activation
Detection and correction in Cond 2 – Detection without
correction in Cond 1 = ∆2 −→ RPFC specific activation
Besides we would like to use a sort of «difference in difference»
∆1 −∆2 to identify a specific activation of limbic
substrates (mirroring the «epistemic feeling» of uneasiness
when coping with the analytical task) −→ Right Anterior
Insula specific activation?
S.Bourgeois-Gironde and Élise Payzan Princeton University 04/05
Project and background
Protocols and predictions (tentative)
General discussion
The two-step «bat and ball problem»: whither a cognitive illusion?
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Basic strategy
Hypothesis to be tested: the violation of the invariance rule is
due to an extrinsic (moral) factor: neither a «cognitive
limitation» effect, nor a «thinking style» bias (toward
intuition)
The procedure should be threefold:
Preliminary step: run the multi-version FE experiment and
distinguish the scenarios such that «framing effect» is the most
frequent pattern vis-a-vis the ones involving steady preferences
across the two frames → see S L.Schneider (2000)
Second step: within the versions with «framing effect» test
«the robustness» of this violation of the invariance rule, by
making the latter directly accessible to the subject
Statistical analysis exploiting individual differences:
positive correlation between an «intuitive thinking» pattern
(see below) and the robustness of the violation?
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First step: standard FE experiment
We envision to use a different versions of the «asian-disease
problem»: rate of death or live of humans, rate of failure or
success of a commercial product → variation in the degree of
moral content
Use of a «within-subjects» procedure: each subject faces in
turn the positive frame (henceforth PF) and the negative
frame (NF) with «filler» tasks between frame pairs, and
sufficient temporal lag between each of the two framing
tasks; this to try to bypass the potential carryover effect
Caveat
In each session they are asked to rank the proposed options
using the scale 1→4
Zero in on the versions such that «framing effect» is the most
frequent pattern (if some); second step restricted to these case
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Second step: «Norm retrieval» test (1 out of 2)
Second stage, the «norm retrieval» : the subject faces the
overall setup, namely PF and NF are presented simultaneously
Information delivering: the experimenter informs the
subject of the logical equivalence
Then the experimenter asks the subjects in this order:
How the average person would respond according to you?
How would you respond?
This design aims to bypass the possible «persistence bias»
in the response More detail
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Second step: «Norm retrieval» test (2 out of 2)
Intuition here: sort of «Revealed Preference Argument»,
echoing Slovic and Tversky’s «Understanding/Accepting
principle»
We claim that if framing effects stem from bounded
rationality then by making the rational rule accessible,
we should observe a correction of the framing effect
Conversely, if the rational rule is not used as a guide by the
subject, while the rule is available, this implies that the
logical invariance principle is dominated, among the different
representations in the set of choices of the subject
In this setup the absence of significant retrieval – given
that our setup is designed to exclude the psychological
dissonance concern – would be a piece of evidence in favor of
the alternative «broadened» rationality hypothesis
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Statistical analysis (1 out of 2)
Use the same pool of subjects in BB and FE and exploit
individual differences using the BB experiment’s outputs
Assume that the bounded rationality hypothesis was not
rejected in BB experiment → Cluster the subjects of the BB
experiment using the patterns of their responses in Cond 1
(«analytical types» Vs «cognitive illusion victims»)
Then look at a potential positive correlation between the
fact of being «analytical» in BB experiment and the
propensity to retrieve the initial response in FE (namely
higher sensitivity to the «cue» provided)−→ We predict the
presence [resp absence] of such a significant link if bounded
rationality [resp «broadened» rationality]
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Statistical analysis (2 out of 2)
Exploit individual differences through a preliminary test
designed to appraise the «thinking style» of the subjects
Preliminary test: «thinking style» measure through a
self-report inventory plus some vignettes tasks inspired of
Epstein’s REI design
Hence cluster the subjects: more «intuitive-experiential» Vs
«more analytical-logical»
Then look at a possible positive correlation between the
fact of being more «analytical» – according to the
inventory – and the propensity to retrieve the initial
response in FE −→ We predict the presence of such a
significant link if the bounded rationality hypothesis is
accurate
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What we mean by «dual process theory»
Here the label «dual process theory» refers to a coherent
corpus of theories that provides insights to think of the
cognitive defects in BB and FE; basically allows us to model
some cases of cognitive defects as the upshot of a conflict
between System 1 and System 2 (S1 and S2)
Kahneman’s insights regarding accessibility: the error in BB
mirrors the relative lack of accessibility of the analytical
«guides»/representations (hence S2 does not override S1’s
response even though there is conflict) −→ if true make this
representation available for the subject and the error should
not be robust
Error-Related-Negativity (ERN) approach: provides a neural
basis for this conflict between S1 and S2.
See the sketchy schema for a brief outline
back
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What this definition of bounded rationality implies
Underlying background: the related hypothesis regarding
massive modularity («hyperlocality») of the mind
We claim that our vision of bounded rationality calls for an
intermediary position regarding modularity: observable
phenomena of bounded rationality are task-dependent, but
they never point to particular semantic contents
Hence Local property of bounded rationality: «in-between»,
neither absolutely rigid, nor content-related
Conversely performances that are inherently cognitively
limited (memory, calculus) are completely rigid, and the ones
that are emotionally driven are extremely local, namely
depending on the content of the task
back
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Caveat related to the «within-subjects» strategy in the
standard FE experiment
In the first step of the FE experiment, each subject is going to
do successively the PF task and the NF one → within-subject
procedure
Trade-off regarding the choice of the experimental design:
«between-subjects» design Vs «within-subjects» design
Relative gain of the «within-subjects» design: «framing
effect» for individuals, not an aggregate outcome; moreover
this individual design allows the retrieval task
Relative cost: big risk of bias, if the subject notices the
variation in the frame (such variation if perceived is a cue for
the subject, induced to be consistent in our experiment)
To minimize this drawback → sufficient temporal lag
between the frame pairs, and «filler» tasks presented during
the time interval
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These particular design is to reveal the «true» preference
of the subjects
We are aware of a potential problem associated with the
«retrieval test»: if the subject was previously inconsistent in
the FE experiment (namely provided a response in PF that is
logically inconsistent with the one she gave in NF), might be
inclined to provide the same response pattern; otherwise
will suffer psychological dissonance → possible Persistence
bias
We claim that the first answer (to the question: «How
would the average person answer?») mirrors the «true»
reaction of the subject (to wit the response without the
dissonance effect); if gap between the first answer and the
self-perspective → piece of evidence towards the existence of
psychological dissonance in this peculiar setup
back
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